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Summary Existing classiﬁcations of potential biological weapons, acknowledge
only limited important parameters of biological weapon potential. Certain pathogen
factors would further inﬂuence the outcome of a potential attack in context with
social and political aspects of the time and space of the attack. The importance
of these factors was investigated through various attack scenarios that have been
developed by the authors, and an individual score for each of these factors was
calculated, based on the overall effect their variation had in the scenario outcome.
A new classiﬁcation score for potential biological weapons was subsequently devel-
oped, one, which drastically alters the perception of risk for certain pathogens, such
as ﬁloviruses and anthrax. This frame further allows for more accurate evaluation of
the bioweapon potential of agents such as avian ﬂu. Recognition of intervening fac-
tors and proper assessment of the actual risk might augment in proper distribution
of interest and funds on relevant medical research.
© 2009 King Saud Bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences. Published by Elsevier
Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Table 1 Factors inﬂuencing the outcome of a poten-
tial bioterrorist attack.
Factors related to the
pathogen
Factors related to time
and place of the attack
Ease of use Geographic parameters
• Availability • Dispersion facilitation
• Ease of weaponization • Transport networks
• Ease of dispersion Targeted population
Inoculum used Healthcare facilities
available
Virulence Local laboratory
facilities
Mortality Local incidence of the
pathogen
Person-to-person
transmission
Awareness
Inoculation period Deﬁnition of hierarchy
Discreet clinical picture Existence of guidelines
Ease of laboratory
diagnosis
• Handling of medical
controversies on the
disease
Availability of treatment
options
• Mass media
interaction
Environmental and animal
effects
Chronicity of the disease
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Introduction
Although microbial pathogens have admittedly
shaped the history of human race through nat-
urally occurring epidemics [1] or deliberate use
[2,3], awareness of the potential consequences of
related incidents has traditionally been low: this
was expected before October 2001 [4], although
the need for preparedness was repeatedly stressed
[5—7]. Since then, detection and response plans
have been extensively developed, either through
medical staff education [8,9] or by attack simula-
tions [10].
By acknowledging the risk of each pathogen,
one can become aware of the parameters of spe-
ciﬁc medical and state response that should be
directly targeted, and of the aspects of health
literacy of medical and paramedical practitioners
and the public that should be urgently addressed.
Furthermore, research on pathogenesis, diagnosis,
treatment, and prophylaxis will preferably target
the most devastating pathogens. Numerous clas-
siﬁcation schemes have emerged from national
and international organizations; the most widely
accepted being the ones by the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) [11], the World Health Organization
(WHO) [12], the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) [13], and the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) Biodefense Research
[14]. These classiﬁcations are largely constructed
based on a series of factors related to the speciﬁc
pathogens, and are essentially products of scien-
tiﬁc analysis of individual pathogen characteristics.
Yet, a potential bioterrorist attack would not be
of isolated scientiﬁc interest, but a major social
event, the severity and implications of which may
vary in time and space: thus, these classiﬁcations
fail to recognize that, due to certain individual
pathogen characteristics, a potential attack would
be a dynamic event that evolves in conjunction
with non-scientiﬁc, social and geographical factors
that can inﬂuence the outcome of an attack. In the
past, only isolated attempts at facing a deliberate
or naturally occurring infectious disease outbreak
in its social context have been developed, most
notably by the use of the Haddon matrix which
incorporates certain non-scientiﬁc, social parame-
ters [15,16]. The authors studied the effects such
factors would have on the overall outcome of a
potential bioterrorist attack, through speciﬁcally
developed attack scenarios for various agents in
varying situations, continuously evolving through
participant feedback. A series of factors, related
both to the individual pathogen and the time and
place of a potential attack were identiﬁed, summa-
rized in Table 1. Certain pathogen characteristics
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Public perception of the
pathogen
ere outlined as interacting with society prepared-
ess for such an attack, and new risk stratiﬁcation
or individual pathogens was composed.
athogen characteristics inﬂuencing the
utcome of a potential attack
ll current classiﬁcation schemes of potential bio-
ogical weapons are based on certain individual
gent characteristics, as the ease of use, viru-
ence, morbidity, mortality, and the ability of the
gent for person-to-person transmission. Yet, even
hese characteristics have been vaguely incorpo-
ated in the existing classiﬁcations, and certain
bvious examples underline this fact: ease of use,
eﬂecting availability, ease of weaponization, and
ase of dispersion is signiﬁcantly different when
omparing Coxiella burnetii, a naturally occurring
athogen easily aerosolized and environmentally
table, causing infection through a limited inocu-
um [17] with smallpox. Mortality induced by Fran-
isella tularensis [18], a Category A agent, is not
igniﬁcantly different from that induced by Rick-
ttsia prowazekii [19], a Category B agent. Compar-
ng smallpox and anthrax attack rates, even under
Ao
i
m
i
r
s
t
[
p
p
M
i
n
s
e
s
m
t
p
c
t
p
a
n
r
o
m
i
[
a
ﬁ
t
m
c
a
r
f
o
B
e
e
o
o
t
a
i
t
l
d
d
r
a
t
s
u
o
m
i
t
a
p
a
s
O
t
a
b
o
s
b
s
e
a
w
u
o
a
u
b
i
2
d
d
c
p
o
r
B
a
d
i
r
i
b
H
d
e
a
b
d
tre we preparing for the proper pathogens?
ptimal circumstances for anthrax release, a signif-
cantly more important role for smallpox emerges.
Furthermore, regarding person-to-person trans-
ission, an anthrax attack could be contained
n the targeted area, while even with a prompt
esponse to a smallpox attack, the evolution of a
econd wave would be hard to avoid, and thus the
hreat of an uncontrollable pandemic would ensue
20]. The wide variation in availability of small-
ox vaccine, even among countries of the Euro-
ean Union [21], underlines the pandemic threat.
oreover, the need for respiratory isolation would
mpose a heavy burden in healthcare systems [22].
Other individual pathogen characteristics have
ot been adequately incorporated in existing clas-
iﬁcations: inoculation period, the time to dis-
ase induction, is critical in initiating countermea-
ures for suspect identiﬁcation. Furthermore, the
ode in which cases cluster is important both for
he social disruption induced and the healthcare
roviders’ response adequacy: a massive cluster of
ases would accompany an anthrax outbreak during
he third week post the attack, thus enhancing the
anic created and necessitating the existence of
dequate healthcare facilities to deal with a huge
umber of new cases. The relationship between
apid evolution of the epidemic and the amount
f social disruption induced has been questioned,
ore notably in a recent attempt to mathemat-
cally deﬁne the weapon potential of a microbe
23]: the authors suggested that the disease burden
nd social disruption induced by human immunode-
ciency virus (HIV) is signiﬁcant, although evolving
hrough an extended period. The authors’ mathe-
atical model yielded a higher potential for HIV
ompared with anthrax. Yet, the sheer panic cre-
ted by a rapidly evolving epidemic, and the time-
estraints this imposes on an adequate response are
actors that can inﬂuence the consequences-impact
f the bioterrorism event. The typical example is
rucella, a Category B agent, possessing a relatively
xtended inoculation period [24]: a possible delib-
rate release would not provoke the steep cluster
f cases observed with other pathogens. The effect
f inoculation period on outcome is also related
o diagnostic procedures for individual pathogens:
ntibody seroconversion is of paramount diagnostic
mportance for certain pathogens. The demonstra-
ion of seroconversion would extend to the conva-
escence period though, thus hampering the direct
iagnostic capacity at the time of cases-peak. New
iagnostic techniques will in the future facilitate
apid diagnosis: at present though, such techniques
re conﬁned to reference centers, and whether
hese techniques could handle the burden of a mas-
ive number of cases (and at what cost) remains
d
l
c
p57
nanswered. One can expect though that the devel-
pment of molecular assays for the recognition of
ultiple pathogens may extend beyond the exper-
mental stage in the near future [25].
The clarity by which a certain clinical presen-
ation could refer to a certain pathogen would
ffect the time to clinicians’ alert: anthrax and
lague would be probably rapidly recognized, while
wareness of the discreet clinical presentation of
mallpox will deﬁnitely improve in the future [26].
n the other hand, the clinical manifestations of
ularemia, Q fever, and brucellosis are non-speciﬁc,
nd thus differential diagnosis in cases of such out-
reaks would most probably be delayed until lab-
ratory diagnosis is achieved, even though clinical
uspicion upon a cluster of cases would deﬁnitely
e raised.
An unrecognized pathogen characteristic with
triking inﬂuence in the potential outcome of delib-
rate release is the availability of intervention
nd prophylactic options: an Ebola virus outbreak,
ould potentially cause a global epidemic, at least
ntil mass production of a suitable vaccine. On the
ther hand, anthrax can be readily treated with
variety of antibiotics [27], some of them often
sed empirically: a direct prompt response would
e thus initiated before deﬁnite diagnosis, while
n a ﬁloviral outbreak (in parallel with the SARS
003 epidemic) time constraints would preclude the
evelopment of adequate preventive measures.
Certain pathogens’ effect extends far from the
eliberate release though: Q fever can cause
hronic disease in susceptible populations (such as
atients with underlying valvulopathies or immun-
deﬁcient, or pregnant), which might actually
esult in more fatalities than the outbreak itself.
rucellosis can also be chronic. Although both
gents are included in the biowarfare lists mainly
ue to their acute potential effects, their abil-
ty to extend beyond the time of the outbreak
aises other issues. The post-Rickettsia prowazekii
nfection Brill-Zinsser disease is a less troublesome,
ut more protracted, example. The evolution of a
emolytic Uremic Syndrome ‘‘epidemic’’ following
eliberate use of Shigella is a further example.
Earth contamination (and thus consequences of
migration and desolation of the targeted area) is
cknowledged by history in the case of anthrax [28],
ut it can also be an issue after C. burnetii release,
ue to the agent’s stability. Zoonotic agents fur-
her induce animal disease, culminating in animal
eaths, abortions of infected herds, and signiﬁcant
oss of animal productivity with assorted economic
onsequences [29].
One ﬁnal important aspect of individual
athogens is the public perception of the pathogen,
G. Pappas et al.
Table 2 Deﬁnition of the risk-score.
Factor Score deﬁnition*
Ease of use 0—3 (0—1 each for
availability, ease of
weaponization, ease of
dispersion)
Virulence 0—2 (0: disease in < 10% of
the exposed, 1: disease in
10—50% of the exposed, 2:
disease in > 50% of the
exposed)
Mortality 0—4 (0: mortality < 5%, 1:
mortality 5—10%, 2:
mortality 10—20%, 3:
mortality 20—50%, 4:
mortality > 50%)
Person-to-person
transmission
0,2, or 5 (0: no
transmission, transmission
through the fecal-oral
route, 5: transmission
through inhaled particles)
Inoculation period −1 or 1 (−1 if prolonged,
1 if not)
Discreet clinical picture 0—2 (0: typical
presentation, 1: certain
pathognomonic features,
2: protean manifestations)
Ease of laboratory
diagnosis
0—1 (0: readily diagnosed,
1 if not-see text)
Availability of treatment
options
0 or 2 or 5 (0: available, 2:
possibly/ partly available,
5: not available)
Environmental/ animal
implications
0—1 (not existing/
existing)
Chronicity of the disease
induced
0—1 (not inducing/
inducing)
Hospital burden 0—3 (0: minimal
admissions required, no
special measures needed,
1: minimal admissions
required, special
measures needed, 2: huge
burden of admissions, no
special measures needed,
3: huge burden of
admissions, special
measures needed)
Public perception of the
pathogen
1: all pathogens
2: anthrax, ﬁloviruses,
smallpox, plague, cholera
(see text for reasoning)
* Escalation of the present scoring system was based on
the effect projected to the overall outcome of the attack
scenarios developed.58
which inﬂuences the social stability and the degree
of panic created. This public perception is largely
inﬂuenced by the degree and frequency of mass
media coverage [30] of the potential consequences
of an attack and state preparedness, but also, in
a more chronic context, by the way ﬁlms present
infectious diseases and biowarfare use [31].
Reclassifying the risk
In developing a new classiﬁcation, an escalating
risk-score was attributed for the various pathogen
parameters summarized in Table 1. Parameters
strongly inﬂuencing the outcome (according to the
effect caused by variation of this parameter on the
overall outcome of the developed attack scenar-
ios) were graded with higher risk-scores (Table 2).
A new classiﬁcation is presented in Table 3. Its most
striking feature is the potential of ﬁloviruses (which
should result in raising interest on these agents),
especially when compared to the potential of
anthrax (a pathogen that has been extensively stud-
ied and feared). Obviously the potential of use of
certain agents is the one that should be more read-
ily addressed worldwide, while for other pathogens,
the potential should be under-emphasized. One
could address the absence of score for likelihood of
an attack with a certain pathogen in our classiﬁca-
tion, yet recent history has outlined that likelihood
is a factor constantly overturned, thus likelihood
should be ignored. Using this model of risk strati-
ﬁcation in the case of inﬂuenza draws some inter-
esting results: based on currently available data on
the H5N1 strain [32], a total score of 15 is calcu-
lated, thus characterizing H5N1 as a more poten-
tially devastating biological weapon than anthrax,
for example. If a novel inﬂuenza strain, retain-
ing the virulence, morbidity and mortality-inducing
characteristics of H5N1 emerged that was capa-
ble of person-to-person transmission, the risk score
would rapidly escalate to 21, placed only behind
ﬁloviruses, but in front of smallpox.
Current medical interest though is not dis-
tributed in accordance to this stratiﬁcation. A
simple method of underlining this discrepancy
is by using the MEDLINE search engine, for the
period of 2005—2008, to identify published works
related to certain of the pathogens: thus, the word
‘‘smallpox’’ returns 856 articles, while the rel-
atively potentially more devastating Ebola virus
(the prime ﬁlovirus) returns 346 articles. The word
‘‘arenavirus’’ returns 441 articles for the same
period, while the word ‘‘anthrax’’ (placed lower
in the current classiﬁcation) returns 1253 articles.
Are we preparing for the proper pathogens? 59
Table 3 Risk-score for selected potential biological weapons.
Pathogen Score Pathogen Score
Filoviruses 23 Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis 11
Plague 19 Tularemia 10
Smallpox 17 Epidemic typhus 10
Arenaviruses 17 Q Fever 10
Inﬂuenza, H5N1 strain 15 Cholera 10
Anthrax 14 Botulism 10
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Shigellosis 11
Agents for which attack scenarios have been developed by the
lthough most of these articles may not represent
ctual research projects on these pathogens, they
re a reﬂection of scientiﬁc community’s interest
nd thus, priorities, priorities that, according to our
lassiﬁcation, should be re-examined.
lacing the risk in time and space
reparedness may be a universal emergency but one
hat varies not only between different countries,
ut also between regions of the same country.
When applying attack scenarios with the same
ndividual pathogen, under the same optimal cli-
actic and geographical conditions of release to
ifferent targeted areas, the discrepancies in out-
omes outline the different priorities that need to
e regionally addressed [33]. An example would be
he targeted population, related to the amount of
eople exposed to a pathogen, the regional abil-
ty to initiate response, the adequacy of diagnostic
aboratory facilities, the ability to handle a large
urden of patients (especially if the attack involves
pathogen requiring respiratory isolation), and,
n the ﬂipside, the promptness of recognition of
he evolving epidemiologic trend (which demands
he existence of a sophisticated and constantly
pdated epidemiologic network, or a speciﬁc bur-
en of patients referring to the same medical cen-
er, thus allowing for a direct recognition of the
ature of the outbreak).
Regional familiarity with the pathogen might
urther complicate the promptness of response: a
ecent study on ability to accurately differentially
iagnose potential infectious diseases that might be
he outcome of a bioterrorist attack elicited that
wareness on pathogens such as brucella and plague
s extremely low among specialists that would be in
he ﬁrst-line response teams [34]. Medical person-
el awareness varies: using brucellosis as an exam-
le, a clinical diagnosis, or at least suspicion, would
e far more easily achieved in rural Greece, than in
S, or even urban Greece. The percentage of false
ﬁ
b
c
oBrucellosis 6
ors.
mallpox alarms reaching the CDC in recent years
26] further outlines this.
The most important parameter though that
eeds to be addressed, both in regional and uni-
ersal level, is the deﬁnition of hierarchy. The
ecent Atlantic Storm exercise outlined the prob-
ems of deﬁning hierarchy [21]. A potential biowar-
are attack is a major social, ﬁnancial and political
hreat, thus one can assume that decision control
hould be handled by government authorities. The
wareness of non-health providers though might
e minimal, while the ability of health providers
o decide on social and political aspects might be
qually inadequate. Priorities might be an issue,
nd moreover, decisions related to medical contro-
ersies might be difﬁcult to reach (for example who
hould receive prophylactic antibiotic treatment in
ases of a bacterial outbreak). Hierarchy might be
urther complicated due to participation of interna-
ional organizations, especially for pathogens that
ave the potential for a worldwide epidemic. Expe-
ience from the SARS 2003 outbreak would facilitate
n coordinating a global response, as long as lessons
earned have ﬁltered through to local medical com-
unities. Furthermore, the extent of the mass
edia collaboration with authorities in avoiding
anic creation [35] (which is related to the media
art in shaping public perceptions and their willing-
ess to implement control of material released) is
n important issue. The role of guidelines for health
ersonnel and public is controversial: developing
uidelines is not an easy issue since public health
odies should take decisions on critical aspects,
nd these decisions should be evidence-based and
ased on previous experience; should the authori-
ies avoid addressing medical controversies in order
o avoid raising panic? Yet, how would authorities
hen escape accusations of misguiding without rais-
ng legal issues? Such controversies should be clari-
ed in advance, or at least supported unanimously
y the local, national, and international medical
ommunity, which brings us back to the deﬁnition
f hierarchy.
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Public response would be crucial in further
allowing the proper evolvement of an adequate
response plan. The perception of panic as a nat-
ural response has been recently widely supported
[36,37], and studies on the psychological reaction
of the public after major events [38,39] elicited a
mature public response. Yet, in practice, what mat-
ters is the effect of panic in the overall response
and not the essence of panic itself, the example
of Israel during the Persian Gulf War being a prime
example [40].
The importance of public reaction is further
signiﬁcant in that civilians and civilian organiza-
tions may have an ambivalent role in augmenting
response. Health-professionals shortage could be
partly overcome by recruitment of non-specialists:
volunteers have played a signiﬁcant role in mass
disasters, but in the setting of an emergency with
specialized needs the lack of adequate expertise
could hamper the overall response. Moreover, ques-
tions about the legal status of volunteer acts and
civil liberties overall might emerge [41,42]. The
World Wide Web has been suggested as helpful in
distributing information through chat rooms, yet
this is also the best way to spread a rumor and
misinformation. Civilian organizations may be of
help in, for example, antibiotic mass distribution,
and church has been cited as the ideal private sec-
toral form of help. Yet, in certain countries, the
role of church might be different: in Greece for
example, cadaver cremation is against the beliefs
of the Orthodox Church, which has an important
public role: how would the Church react during a
possible attack is something that should be pre-
addressed.
Conclusion
All factors interact in a complex manner, and
thus the outcome of a potential bioterrorist attack
would differ for a given pathogen in even dif-
ferent areas of a single country, and the out-
come of an attack in a given area would differ
for each pathogen. Current classiﬁcations ignore
certain pathogen characteristics that would signif-
icantly inﬂuence the outcome of an outbreak. A
shift in the interest of medical community towards
the potentially most devastating pathogens is war-
ranted, and should be based on a similar distri-
bution of funds available for research [43]. Edu-
cational programs for the public should emerge,
walking the ﬁne line between health literacy and
state of fear [44]. If the public knows, and trusts
that medical and state authorities know, social dis-
[G. Pappas et al.
uption could be minimized to levels related only
o pathogen characteristics and not social ones.
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